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DEVIATE SEXUAL BEHAVIOR UNDER
THE NEW ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE
Prior to 1961, the Illinois statute, typical of many American statutes
concerning deviate sexual behavior,' stated:
The infamous2 crime against nature, either with man or beast, shall
subject the offender to be punished by imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary for a term of not less than one year and not more than ten years.3
The existence and enforcement of this statute produced several problems:
(1) a lack of notice that the conduct in a particular situation was illegal;
(2) a pattern of uneven enforcement; (3) the possibility of widespread
blackmail; (4) the creation of serious guilt feelings among persons engag-
ing in this behavior; and (5) a pattern of uncontrollable deviate behavior.
The new Illinois criminal code, like the Model Penal Code and the Pro-
posed New York Penal Law,4 is an attempt to solve these problems.
1. See Spence, The Law of Crime Against Nature, 32 N.C.L. Rnv. 312, 318-19
(1954).
2. "The crime against nature" is one of the offenses labelled as "infamous" by Ill.
Laws 1953, at 1529. "IT]he test of an infamous crime . . . [in Illinois] is the nature
of the crime, and not the nature of the punishment, which latter is the test of an in-
famous crime within the meaning of the fifth amendment of the federal constitution."
Comment, 5 ILL. L. Rav. 108, 111 (1910).
3. Ill. Laws 1827, ch. 38, § 141, at 132.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, art. 11 (1961); MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 (Prop.
Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter cited as MPC]; PROP. N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 135
(1964). These three are the only codes which have, in recent years, fully reconsidered
proscriptions of sexual offenses. The Model Penal Code provisions were commented
upon in the 1955 Tentative Draft Number 4, and, with minor changes and reclassifica-
tion of sections, were included in the 1962 Tentative Final Draft. The Model code's
comments were drawn upon by the Illinois drafters in 1960, and the New York commit-
tee in 1964. The Illinois code was adopted and incorporated into the general statutes
in 1961; apparently no action has been taken in New York.
Wisconsin and Louisiana completed revisions of their respective penal codes before
the tentative drafts of the Model Penal Code were published in 1955. Wisconsin re-
placed the language of its sodomy section, formerly Wis. Laws 1897, ch. 198, which
penalized any person who committed "sodomy, or the crime against nature, with man-
kind or beast," with a more specific statute. This section (Wis. C, m. CODE § 944.17
(1955)), titled "Sexual Perversion," proscribes the commission of an "abnormal act of
sexual gratification involving the sex organ of one person and the mouth or anus of
another" or "involving his sex organ and the sex organ, mouth, or anus of an animal."
Louisiana included in its revised code an offense called the "crime against nature,"
(LA. R v. STAT. § 89 (1950)), which is defined as "the unnatural carnal copulation by
a human being with another of the same or opposite sex or with an animal." This lan-
guage is only slightly more explicit than that appearing in the older section (La. Acts.
1896, No. 69, § 1), which proscribed the "abominable and detestable crime against
nature with mankind or beast with the sectual organs or with the mouth."
The Wisconsin section clearly has defined the proscribed acts, although not the fac-
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I. PROBLEMS BEFORE 1961
A. Notice of the Offense
The most obvious problem that arose under the earlier Illinois statute
was a lack of definition of the phrase "crime against nature."'5 Judicial
interpretation was required to determine which unnatural sexual acts were
prohibited. Faced with this problem, some courts responded by limiting
"crime against nature" to the unnatural sexual acts prohibited at common
law: anal intercourse between humans and between human and beast.'
Such conduct was variously referred to at common law as "sodomy,"'
"bestiality,"' or "buggery." 9 Other courts, like Illinois, have found a legis-
lative intention to extend the common law proscription." If the second
approach is taken, however, a court is faced with the further problem of
deciding what additional abnormal sexual acts are included.
In Honselman v. People" the defendant, charged with "the infamous
crime against nature," contended that: (1) the indictment was fatally de-
fective because it charged only in the language of the statute and thus did
not inform him of the nature of the offense with the specificity normally
tual situations in which the acts are proscribed; Louisiana did neither and therefore its
revision is of little value.
5. The court in Honselman v. People, 168 Ill. 172, 48 N.E. 304, 305 (1897), stated:
"The legislature has not seen fit to define it further than by the general term, and the
records of the courts need not be defiled with the details of different acts which may go
to constitute it."
6. Any act not falling within the common law definition would incur criminal penal-
ties only if the legislature had proscribed that act in another statute.
7. "Sodomy" is derived from the name of the biblical town of Sodom, the male in-
habitants of which engaged in anal intercourse. See Genesis 19:4-14.
8. "Bestiality" is anal intercourse by a man or woman with an animal. Spence, supra
note 1, at 314; BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 203 (4th ed. 1951). The Old Testament refers
to sodomy as "an abomination" (Leviticus 18:22) and bestiality as "confusion" (Le-
viticus 18:23) and decrees the death penalty for both (sodomy-Leviticus 20:13, bes-
tiality-Leviticus 20:15). These passages appear to be the source of the adjective
"abominable" as used by Blackstone: "the abominable crime not fit to be mentioned
among Christians." 4 BLAGKSTONE COMMENTARIES *215.
9. "Buggery" is derived from the word "bulgar": a group of Bulgarian heretics were
widely accused of deviate practices during the Middle Ages. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULA-
TION OF SEXUAL CONDUCT 53 (1961). The early English law classified all acts between
persons, and persons and animals under the title "buggery." 25 Hen. 7, c. 6 (1533).
See the differing definitions of these terms presented in Spence, supra note 1, at 314;
SHERWIN, SEX AND THE STATUTORY LAW pt. 1, at 35 (1949); 16 MERCER L. RV. 345
(1964); Bowman & Engle, A Psychiatric Evaluation of Homosexuality, 29 TEMP.
L.Q. 273, 274 (1956). For a complete historical review of deviate sexual practices, see
Bowman & Engle, supra at 276-77.
10. Spence, supra note 1, at 319; 81 C.J.S. Sodomy § I(b)(1) (1953); see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.5, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (now MPC § 213.2).
11. 168 Ill. 172, 48 N.E. 304 (1897).
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required in accusatory pleadings; and (2) "the crime against nature" cov-
ered only the acts prohibited at common law, and so fellatio was not pro-
scribed. The court, as have others faced with the same problem, rejected
the first contention, finding that the charge in the language of the statute
was adequate,12 and rejected the second contention, ruling that the legisla-
ture clearly intended to encompass more acts than were prohibited by the
common law. 3 In People v. Smith, 4 however, the court took the oppor-
tunity to limit the scope of the statute. The defendant was charged in the
language of the statute; the evidence proved that he had committed cun-
nilingus. The court reversed and remanded the case, finding the indictment
defective for naming the victim incorrectly, and ruling that that act was
not covered by the statute because cunnilingus does not involve use of the
male sex organ." An accused, as Honselman or Smith, might well believe
12. The name of the man with whom the crime was committed was given, and
the count satisfied the requirement of the Criminal Code by stating the offense
in the terms and language of the statute.... The legislature has not seen fit
to define it further than by the general term, and the records of the courts
need not be defiled with the details of different acts which may go to consti-
tute it. A statement of the offense in the language of the statute, or so plainly
that its nature may be easily understood by the jury, is all that is required.
Id. at 174-75, 48 N.E. at 305.
As late as 1957 an Illinois court found the offense so offensive to its sense of decency that
it refused to relate in detail the commission of the act for which the defendant had been
convicted of "the crime against nature." People v. Stevens, 11 Ill. 2d 21, 141 N.B.2d
33 (1957); see Bowman & Engle, supra note 9, at 275.
13. [The code] plainly shows that the legislature included in the crime against
nature other forms of the offense than sodomy or buggery. It is there enacted:
'Every person convicted of the crime of * * * sodomy, or other crime against
nature, *** shall be deemed infamous,' etc. [See note 2 supra.] The method
employed in this case is as much against nature, in the sense of being unnatural
and against the order of nature, as sodomy or any bestial or unnatural copula-
tion that can be conceived. It is within the statute. Honselman v. People,
168 Ill. 172, 175, 48 N.E. 304, 305 (1897).
This position was contrary to that taken by the majority of state courts, which hold that
acts per os are not included within the crime against nature. See Spence, supra note 1,
at 315 n.22.
14. 258 Ill. 502, 101 N.E. 957 (1913).
15. At early common law, both penetration and emission were essential elements of the
offenses of rape and sodomy. The difficulty of proving the completion of the crime led
to the enactment of a statute providing that proof of penetration alone was sufficient. 9
Geo. 4, c. 31, § 18 (1828). The early Illinois statute (ILL. REv. STAT. § 49, at 179
(1833)) applied this rule to "the crime against nature." The use of the male sex organ
was retained as an essential element of the offense.
The court, in remanding Smith suggested that the defendant should have been
prosecuted under the statute proscribing indecent liberties with children (Ill. Laws 1907,
at 266). This statute expressly excepted from its coverage acts of sodomy and "Infamous
crimes against nature," and so did prohibit cunnilingus with a child. In People v. Pecl:,
314 Ill. 237, 145 N.E. 353 (1924), the defendant, accused of an act of fellatio with a
six year old boy, was convicted under this same statute. That act had previously been
held to be a "crime against nature" and so was not punishable under the "indecent
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that the term "crime against nature" refers only to the acts prohibited at
common law; if, after he has committed an act not within the common
law definition, the statute is redefined to include that act, criminal sanctions
may be imposed without proper notice.
B. Unequal Law Enforcement
Deviate sexual behavior is not proscribed in every state,16 and where it is,
enforcement is uneven. The 1948 Kinsey report on the sexual conduct of
American males revealed that thirty-seven per cent of the total male popu-
lation has engaged in some form of homosexual activity." Nevertheless, a
survey conducted the following year indicated that less than one per cent
of those persons subject to prosecution were actually charged and con-
victed."8 "Only enough violators are arrested and convicted to keep what
seems at the moment to be substantial amount of peace. Very often that
depends upon the personality of the enforcing officer and how he happens
to feel at the moment."' 9 This is most clearly shown in the regulation of
consensual behavior: not only is such conduct almost impossible to detect,"0
but even when it is, criminal proceedings are rarely instituted,2' and, be-
cause of the necessity of corroboration, rarely carried through to convic-
tion.2--
liberties" section. Nevertheless, proof of the act was used as evidence of his intent to
indecently and sexually arouse the child.
16. See ERNST & LOTH, AMERICAN SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE KINSEY REPORT
128-31 (1948).
17. KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 650
(1948).
18. Note, 17 U. CH. L. REV. 162, 169-72 (1950). Another commentator has esti-
mated that for every sixty million homosexual acts performed in the United States there
are only twenty convictions. DRUMMOND, THE SEX PAADOX 123 (1953). For facts on
the English pattern of enforcement, see 122 JUST. P. 796, 817 (1958); COMMITTEE ON
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT 38-39 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as WOLFENDEN REPORT].
19. ERNST & LOTH, Op. cit. supra note 16, at 125. Compare KINSEY, POMEROY &
MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 559. "Whether laxity stems from insufficient public
pressure, lack of adequate confinement facility, inability to obtain evidence with which to
convict, or general disinterest is not determined." DRUMMOND, op. cit. supra note 18, at
123.
20. See MUELLER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 19-20.
21. It has been suggested that full enforcement will occur only in situations where the
offense is directed against children, or violates the public sense of decency. DRUMMOND,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 122.
22. A common rule is that the testimony of an accomplice or co-participant must be
corroborated by independent evidence. "[S]ince sodomy is usually committed very
privately the rule of corroboration, as applied, thwarts the conviction of many who are
guilty." MAY, LAW OF CRIMES 245 (4th ed. Sears & Weihofen 1938).
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C. Blackmail
Because the criminal law, as well as prevailing social opinion, condemned
all acts of deviate behavior prior to 1961, the Illinois offender was con-
stantly liable to blackmail by a victim, a consenting co-participant or a
third person with knowledge of the behavior.23 Although the possible num-
ber of actual blackmail situations is high, few are reported2' because the
offenders fear: (1) revelation of the conduct to friends and relatives; (2)
subsequent prosecution;5 and (3) loss of employment.26 Statutes such as
that formerly found in Illinois have been criticized as creating opportunities
for the blackmailer-because all deviate acts are proscribed, the extortion-
ist has a wider range of victims. 27
D. Guilt Feelings
The Kinsey reports indicate the widespread nature of the practices pro-
scribed by state statutes.2" It is certain, then, that knowledge of both the
criminal sanctions and the social condemnation attached to such behavior
produces significant psychic disturbances or guilt feelings in many of these
offenders. Doubts have been expressed on the wisdom of criminal provi-
sions that foster the development of psychological problems resulting from
sexual behavior that is legally deviate but factually prevalent."
23. DRUMMOND, op. cit. supra note 18, at 129. The common law recognized the
seriousness of a threat to reveal past acts of sodomy by making this an exception to the
usual requirement that in a robbery prosecution, the alleged threat must be of bodily
harm. See PERKINS, CRIWMAL LAW 324-25 (1957); Houston v. Commonwealth, 87 Va.
257, 263-64, 12 S.E. 385, 387 (1890).
24. WOLPENDEN REPORT 70-71. Illinois cases illustrate that a person who has engaged
in deviate practices may be placed in a blackmail situation. In Maloney v. People, 229
Ill. 593, 597, 82 N.E. 389, 391 (1907), it was held that a conspiracy to extort from an
offender was "an offense . . . against public justice." See also People v. Clarke, 407 Ill.
353, 95 N.E.2d 425 (1950).
25. Bowman & Engle, supra note 9, at 297; WOLFENDEN REPORT 70-71.
26. Because they are susceptible to blackmail, homosexuals are considered national
security risks by the federal government and are rarely hired. DRUMMOND, op. cit. supra
note 18, at 129; Bowman & Engle, supra note 9, at 299, 315. Risks inherent in private
employment are discussed in Bowman & Engle, supra note 9, at 301.
27. WOLPENDEN REPORT 70. A threat to use sodomy as a ground for divorce may
enable a spouse to extort larger or smaller alimony payments or to acquire certain
benefits not awarded by the court. Note, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 83, 88-89 (1959).
28. KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN', op. cit. supra note 17, at 623, 650-51 (sodomy),
670 (bestiality).
29. MUELLER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 18; DRUMMOND, op. cit. supra note 18, at 123;
KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 610, 633; cf. ERNST & LOTH, Op.
cit. supra note 16, at 112.
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E. Uncontrollable Behavior
Some commentators have argued that persons who engage in deviate
sexual conduct are suffering from a mental disease and that many of these
persons are unable to control their sexual impulses. Therefore, a statute
providing criminal sanctions for deviate behavior imposes strict liability
regardless of one's ability to direct and control his behavior. Such criminal
liability is clearly in derogation of the common law tradition of individual
responsibility for criminal acts.
II. SOLUTION
The new Illinois article, like the Model and proposed New York codes,
attempts to solve these problems by clearly defining terms and clarifying
the language and content of the various sections of the criminal law. In
addition, the Illinois drafters restructured the code around four considera-
tions that were believed to be within the realm of legislative activity. Each
of the sections of article 11 (Sex Offenses) is concerned with one of these
interests:
(1) protection of the individual against forcible acts; (2) protection
of the young and immature from the sexual advances of older and
more mature individuals; (3) protection of the public from open and
notorious conduct which disturbs the peace, tends to promote breaches
of the peace, or openly flouts accepted standards of morality in the
community; and (4) protection of the institution of marriage and
normal family relationships from sexual conduct which tends to de-
stroy them."
The Illinois drafters did not focus on the religious tenets or social customs
purporting to repress conduct; they looked to its effect, not its moral ac-
ceptability.
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, art. 11, comment (1961). The comments continue:
It will be noted that the key interests sought to be protected are freedom from
force for everyone; freedom for the unfair exploitation of youth before they are
mature enough to make valid individual judgments; freedom of the public from
"open and notorious" acts; and the community's interest in preserving the monog-
amous marriage and family institution which is the current basis of our social and
moral structure. The Committee considers the protection of these interests suf-
ficiently vital to warrant criminal sanctions for their violations. Ibid.
The law was seen as a means:
to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive or
injurious, and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of
others, particularly those who are specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in
body or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of special physical, official or economic de-
pendence. WOLFENDEN REPORT 23.
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A. Notice of the Offense
1. What Conduct is Proscribed?
To provide sufficient notice of the exact character of the proscribed be-
havior, the new Illinois criminal code, 3 like the Model Penal Code" and
the Proposed New York Penal Law,' 3 includes a specific definition of devi-
ate sexual conduct. Section 11-2 provides: " 'Deviate sexual conduct' for
the purpose of this Article, means any act of sexual gratification involving
the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another." 4
These three codes subject acts between persons to regulation; however,
they do not all regulate acts between a person and an animal. The com-
mittee for the new Illinois criminal code, adopting the position that the
latter acts "are usually brief, youthful 'experiments' rather than part of a
pattern of conduct that either contributes to or constitutes a significant de-
generation of the individual involved,' ' drafted section 11-2, defining
"deviate sexual conduct" to include only all unnatural acts of sexual grati-
fication between humans3 The New York code also defines deviate sexual
intercourse to be "deviate conduct between persons;"1' 7 however, acts with
animals are proscribed in another section of the New York law." The
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-2 (1961), provides:
The provisions of this Code shall be construed in accordance with the general
purpose hereof, to:
(a) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses;
(b) Define adequately the act and mental state which constitute each of-
fense ....
32. MPC § 213.2, titled "Deviate Sexual Intercourse by Force or Imposition," pro-
scribed "sexual intercourse per os or per anum between human beings who are not
husband and wife, and any form of sexual intercourse with an animal."
33. PROP. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.00(2) (1964) defines deviate sexual intercourse
as "sexual conduct between persons not married to each other consisting of contact be-
tween the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, or the mouth and the vagina."
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-2 (1961). This definition obviates the problem en-
countered in Honselman and Smith, since now (1) each of the acts involved in those
cases would fall within the statute, and (2) sufficient notice of the nature of the offense
would be provided.
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-2, comment (1961). The committee comments
stated that: "Focusing public attention on the person who happens to be found in such
an act serves no useful social purpose and may seriously impair the development of the
accused to a normal life." The committee, therefore, did not proscribe criminally un-
natural acts between humans and animals unless such acts were covered by disorderly
conduct or similar statutes. Ibid. See also KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, Op. cit. supra
note 17, at 667-78; KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE 502-09 (1953).
36. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
37. See note 33 supra.
38. PROP. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.55 (1964) provides: "A person is guilty of
bestiality when he engages in sexual conduct with an animal or a dead human body."
The attitude of the New York revisers, similar to the attitude of the Illinois commission,
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Model code differs from the Illinois and New York codes by defining devi-
ate sexual intercourse to include acts with animals; "9 these acts, however,
are not penalized."0
Although each code differs in its basic definition of "deviate sexual con-
duct" or "deviate sexual intercourse," each uses its own definition consis-
tently. Whenever used, the phrase refers only to the acts mentioned in the
definition; any other type of behavior must be separately proscribed."
2. In What Circumstances Is This Conduct Illegal?
To determine whether sufficient notice is given to the defendant concern-
ing the circumstances in which defined deviate behavior is illegal, the pro-
visions of the Illinois code may be analyzed with reference to the four
interests articulated by the revising committee. When the purpose of the
legislation is defined in terms of these interests, there is a broad range of
conduct that is not proscribed: consensual behavior between unrelated
adults." The Illinois, New York, and Model codes are each, more or less
explicitly, concerned with the four enumerated interests and none pro-
scribes deviate sexual conduct performed in private by consenting adults."
This is best revealed by the definitions of deviate behavior set forth in the
New York and Model codes, specifically excluding conduct between mar-
ried couples,"' and the failure of each code to proscribe in any section pri-
vate conduct between other consenting adults.
was that "the offender is a sick individual who injures himself more than he does the
public. Therefore, misdemeanor punishment is more than adequate for this crime."
PRoP. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.55, comment (1964).
39. See note 32 supra.
40. See MPC §§ 213.2-.4. In each situation in which deviate sexual intercourse is
declared illegal by the Model code, the offender and the victim are always humans.
41. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-4 (1961) (lewd fondling or touching), 11-5
(lewd fondling or touching, any lewd act), 11-9 (lewd exposure of the body, lewd fond-
ling or caress); MPC §§ 213.4 (sexual contact), 213.5 (indecent exposure), 251.1 (open
lewdness); PROP. N.Y. PENAl. LAw §§ 135.00(3) (1964) (sexual contact), 250.15 (a
lewd or sexual act).
42. See generally WOLFENDEN REPORT 23-24. The members of the drafting committee
agreed that such behavior falls within "a realm of private morality and immorality which
is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business." Id. at 48.
43. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5(1), comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (now
MPC § 213.2). The proposed New York code provides:
1. Whether or not specifically stated, it is an element of every offense defined in this
article that the criminal sexual act was committed without consent of the victim.
PROP. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.05 (1964).
"[The Illinois code] is not intended to proscribe any sexual conduct between consenting
adults unless such conduct adversely affects one of the key interests sought to be pro-
tected." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, art. 11, comment (1961).
44. See the definitions in notes 32 and 33 supra.
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a. protection of the individual from force. Section 11-3 of the new Illinois
code ("Deviate Sexual Assault") provides protection of the individual from
deviate sexual conduct involving the use of force." It does not cover acts
consented to by young children; these are proscribed in sections drafted
specifically to protect youth.46
The Model Penal Code and the Proposed New York Penal Law also
proscribe forcible deviate sexual behavior. The Model code terms behavior
involving force a felony of the second degree, and that involving other im-
position, a felony of the third degree.4 Under New York law such be-
havior, classified as one of the greatest of felonies, is included within the
first degree sodomy section." In contrast to the Illinois provision, however,
neither of these codes confines the proscription to forcible acts; each in-
cludes deviate conduct with a (consenting) child, 9 or a physically helpless
person."0
b. protection of youth. The Illinois drafters, seeking to protect children
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-3 (1961), provides:
Any person of the age of 14 years and upwards who, by force or threat of force,
compels any other person to perform or submit to any act of deviate sexual conduct
commits deviate sexual assault.
In parallel fashion, "rape" is defined in terms of sexual intercourse accompanied by the
use of force. ILL. REv. STAT. ch 38, § 11-1 (1961). There is no longer an offense of
"statutory rape"; sexual activity with a person below the age of consent (eighteen years)
is proscribed in the sections dealing exclusively with the protection of children. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-4 to -6 (1961).
Section 11-3 fails to define "force or threat of force." It was the intent of the
drafters that the courts apply the requirements and standards developed in Illinois rape
cases to the forceful deviate conduct situations. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-3, comment
(1961). This appears to be a reasonable level of notice, especially since in four of the
five cases prosecuted under the older Illinois sodomy section, the defendant had also been
charged with rape. People v. Haran, 27 Ill. 2d 229, 188 N.E.2d 707 (1963) (two
indictments); People v. O'Connor, 412 Ill. 304, 106 N.E.2d 176 (1952); People v. De
Frates, 395 Ill. 439, 70 N.E.2d 591 (1946) (separate counts in same indictment);
People v. Elder, 382 Ill. 388, 47 N.E.2d 694 (1943) (three indictments). None of the
appeals in these cases was on the issue of the standards used to evaluate "force or threat
of force." The fifth case, People v. Funches, 17 Ill. 2d 529, 162 N.E.2d 393 (1959),
involved a deviate sexual act by a man on another man, allegedly at knifepoint.
46. ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-4 to -6 (1961).
47. MPC § 213.2, "Deviate Sexual Intercourse by Force or Imposition," describes
situations parallel to those included in § 213.1, "Rape and Related Offenses."
48. PROP. N.Y. P.NAL LAw § 135.50 (1964), "Sodomy in the first degree," parallels
§ 135.35, which defines first degree rape.
49. The Model code proscribes such behavior with a person less than ten years old;
the New York provision, under age eleven.
50. In addition, the Model code covers acts committed on (1) a person submitting
through fear; (2) a person whose mental conditions "renders him incapable of ap-
praising the nature of his conduct"; or (3) a person who is unaware of the sexual
character of the activity.
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from exploitation by more mature individuals and to discourage adolescent
sexual experimentation," proposed three offenses to prohibit all forms of
sexual activity with children: sections 11-4, "Indecent Liberties with a
Child";52 11-5, "Contributing to the Sexual Delinquency of a Child";1
3
and 11-6, "Indecent Solicitation of a Child."54  This categorization"
51. See ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-3, 11-5, comments (1961).
52. Section 11-4 provides:
(a) Any person of the age of 17 years and upwards who performs or submits
to any of the following acts with a child under the age of 16 commits indecent
liberties with a child:
(2) Any act of deviate sexual conduct;
See People v. Freedman, 4 Ill. 2d 414, 123 N.E.2d 317 (1954), for an earlier definition
of the term "indecent liberties."
53. Section 11-5 provides:
(a) Any person of the age of 14 years and upwards who performs or submits to
any of the following acts with any person under the age of 18 contributes to the
sexual delinquency of a child:
(2) Any act of deviate sexual conduct;
See Peoplev. Ostrowski, 334 Ill. App. 494, 80 N.E.2d 89, aff'd, 83 N.E.2d 276 (1948),
for a discussion of the range of conduct covered by the "Contributing" provision.
54. Section 11-6 provides:
(a) Any person of the age of 17 years and upwards who solicits a child under
the age of 13 to do any act, which if done would be an indecent liberty with a child
or an act of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child commits indecent
solicitation of a child.
55. The sanctions of § 11-4, a felony, are imposed only when a two-year age
disparity is shown; i.e., when a person seventeen years or older performs or submits to an
act of deviate sexual conduct with a child under sixteen. But under § 11-5, a mis-
demeanor, the victim can be older than or the same age as the offender-the minimum
age of an offender is fourteen, and the maximum age of a victim is eighteen. Although
every violator of § 11-4(a) (2) (deviate sexual conduct) is also subject to punishment
under § 11-5(a) (2), the opposite is not true; therefore, the "Contributing" section is a
lesser included offense in relation to the "Indecent Liberties" provision.
The minimum age provision, carried over from the earlier rape statutes, is based on
the common law presumption that a male under fourteen years was incapable of com-
mitting rape. See ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1, comment (1961). Because females
may, without parental consent, contract a valid marriage in Illinois at eighteen, that was
chosen as the age of consent to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct. See ILL.
Rzv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-5, comment (1961). The New York code drafters believed
that "when considered within the framework of modem American culture, seventeen is a
more realistic age of consent than eighteen." Paop. N.Y. PE.NAL LAW 342 (1964).
Section 11-6, "Indecent Solicitation of a Child," is the least serious offense, since no
overt sexual act need be involved. The proscribed conduct is the solicitation by a person
seventeen years or older of a child under thirteen to do an act declared illegal by § 11-4
or 11-5.
Although the younger participant in such acts is usually referred to as the "victim,'-
this does not necessarily mean that he has been subject to coercion. "Generally, all three
sections deal with non-violent acts with children, and the usual situations where actual
consent of the child to the specific course of conduct is obtained." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
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allows the prosecutor to charge a defendant with a specific act against
children."8
The Model Penal Code and the Proposed New York Penal Law do not
categorize sexual offenses according to the interests sought to be protected,
but rather include provisions concerning children in various other sections.
For example, the Model code includes conduct with children in the section
entitled "Sexual Assault;"57 children are protected in the New York code
in sections dealing with sodomy and sexual abuse.18
In one respect the codes are similar: because each is aimed at the pre-
vention of sexual exploitation of youth, each punishes behavior with
younger more severely than with older children. For example, the New
York code grades its sodomy provisions according to the age of the vic-
tim." Illinois declares sexual conduct with a child under thirteen to be a
felony; with a child under eighteen, a misdemeanor."
§ 11-3, comment (1961). An attempt to commit an offense defined by §§ 11-4 to -6 is
proscribed by the general attempt provision of the code. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4
(1961).
56. See discussion supra note 15.
57. MPC § 213.4. This covers conduct (a) with a child less than ten years of age;
(b) if the offender is at least four years older than his victim, a person under sixteen
years of age; or (c) if the offender is legally responsible for the victim, a person under
twenty-one years of age.
58. PROP. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 135.40-.65 (1964).
59. PROP. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.40-.55 (1964).
60. See note 55 supra. If People v. Chism, 6 Ill. 2d 262, 128 N.E.2d 729 (1955) and
People v. Jones, 6 Ill. 2d 252, 128 N.E.2d 739 (1955), two cases prosecuted under the
older provisions, arose today, they would point up some of the problems of arbitrary age
categories. Jones, thirty-four, and his companion, Chism, presumably about twenty-four,
performed homosexual acts with two teenage boys. Both defendants were convicted.
Jones, whose partner was fifteen, was sentenced to four to eight years in the penitentiary;
Chism, whose partner was sixteen, to two to five years. Under the 1961 code, Jones
would be guilty of a felony (§ 11-4), carrying a sentence of one to twenty years in the
penitentiary and Chism would be guilty of a misdemeanor (§ 11-5), carrying a maximum
fine of one thousand dollars, or a maximum sentence of one year in an institution other
than the state penitentiary, or both.
The nineteen reported cases prosecuted under the old crime against nature section
included thirteen involving sexual misconduct with children. Today ten would be
covered by the proscription of § 11-4 because the victim was under sixteen years of age:
People v. Glenn, 25 Ill. 2d 82, 182 N.E.2d 670 (1962); People v. Jones, supra; People v.
Sampson, 1 Ill. 2d 399, 115 N.E.2d 627 (1953); People v. Whitman, 406 Ill.
593, 94 N.E.2d 506 (1950); People v. Kraus, 395 Ill. 233, 69 N.E.2d 885 (1946);
People v. Fitzgibbons, 346 Ill. 338, 179 N.E. 106 (1931); People v. Smith, 258 Il. 502,
101 N.E. 957 (1913); People v. Abrams, 249 11. 619, 94 N.E. 985 (1911); Kelly v.
People, 192 Il1. 119, 61 N.E. 425 (1901); Honselman v. People, 168 Ill. 172, 48 N.E.
304 (1897). The other three would fall under § 11-5 because the victim was over fifteen
but under eighteen. People v. Stevens, 11 Ill. 2d 21, 141 N.E.2d 33 (1957); People v.
Chism, supra; People v. Dabbs, 370 Ill. 378, 19 N.E.2d 175 (1938).
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The Model code penalizes consensual deviate behavior with a child less
than sixteen only if the accused is four years older than his partner;"' the
New York provisions do not proscribe consensual acts.62 The Illinois draft-
ers alone sought to curtail sexual experimentation between youths as well as
exploitation of children,63 and so proscribed deviate behavior between
adolescents of specified ages.64
c. protection of public morals. To prevent shocking and embarrassing dis-
plays of sexual activities,65 the Illinois code proscribes in section 11-9
("Public Indecency"), deviate sexual conduct in a public place.6 The
Model Penal Code also defines deviate behavior in a public place as an act
of "public indecency" ;"7 the proposed New York code includes this offense
under two sections: "Disorderly Conduct"6 and "Loitering."6 9
Although each code does proscribe deviate behavior that might consti-
tute an affront to those observing it,7" not all proscribe the solicitation of
61. MPC § 213.4.
62. See note 43 supra.
63. "It is intended that so far as this misdemeanor provision [§ 11-5] is concerned,
that sexual activities with children under 18 to be discouraged generally, regardless of
their prior sexual experience or inexperience." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-3, comment
(1961).
64. See note 55 supra. However each code takes a different stand on the question of
affirmative defenses. The New York code (PROP. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.10(2) (1964))
does not allow the defense of a mistake in the age of the victim who is under seventeen
years. This, in effect, is strict liability for sexual misbehavior with children. The Model
code (MPG § 213.6(1)) holds the offender absolutely responsible for deviate sexual
conduct with pre-pubertal children, but provides the affirmative defense for offenses
with children over ten. Under the Illinois article, one accused of the felony "Indecent
Liberties" is provided certain defenses: (I) a reasonable belief that the child was six-
teen or older; (2) the child's activities as a prostitute; and (3) the previous marriage
of the child. The drafters believed that if any of these were proven, the key element of
exploitation, the knowing and deliberate abuse of the young by older persons, is absent
and the conduct should not be proscribed under this section. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-4, comment (1961). Because the two misdemeanor sections, §§ 11-5 to -6, are not
primarily directed toward the exploitation of youth, affirmative defenses are not available.
65. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-9, comment (1961).
66. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-9 (1961). "Public place" is defined as "any place
where the conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by others." ILL. Rav. STAT.
ch. 38, § 11-9(b) (1961).
67. MPG § 251.1, "Open Lewdness," is found in Article 251, "Public Indecency." A
related offense, "Indecent Exposure," is defined in § 213.5.
68. PROP. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05(4) (1964).
69. PROP. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 250.15(3) (1964). In § 250.00, "public place" is
defined as "a place to which the public or a substantial group of people has access" and
a number of locations are identified as fitting this description.
70. It is the very affront itself which refutes the argument: "[I]t would be . ..
ludricrous that... [two consenting adults] should be liable to... [the maximum punish-
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this conduct. The Model code, in an attempt to avoid the "indiscriminate
seeking or making one's self available for deviate sexual relations,""1 defines
as a petty misdemeanor loitering for the purpose of soliciting or being so-
licited."2 The proposed New York law also proscribes this conduct.72 The
Illinois drafters, however, considering solicitation as "essentially a private
rather than a public irritation,"' not likely to cause affront to others, did
not proscribe it.
The practice of prostitution may also be regarded as conduct from which
the public morals must be protected. Each code has prohibited deviate
sexual conduct performed or submitted to by a person 7l for money." The
Illinois and Model codes have attached minor criminal sanctions to pa-
tronizing a prostitute, in an effort to eliminate prostitution itself."' New
York does not prohibit such conduct.
d. protection of the family. Both the proposed New York and the Model
codes group the statute defining incest with other sections concerning
offenses against the family.78 The Illinois code, however, has included this
offense within article 11 ("Sex Offenses") 71 in an attempt to protect
society's interests in stable marriage and family relationships from the
threat of deviate sexual conduct.
Two considerations guided the Illinois drafters in the formulation of their
incest sections. The first, "the biological risk of genetically defective off-
spring,"8" was the sole concern of the New York and Model codes, which
ment] because they happened to be found committing in public an act which, if com-
mitted in private, would not be criminal at all." WOLFENDEN REPoRT 61.
71. MPG § 251.3 and accompanying comments.
72. MPG § 251.3.
73. PRop. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 250.15(3) (1964). A person convicted of this "viola-
tion" is liable for only a fine or a maximum imprisonment of fifteen days.
74. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-9, comment (1961).
75. An early Illinois case held that male prostitutes were not covered under the pre-
vious statute. People v. Rice, 277 Ill. 521, 115 N.E. 631 (1917). However, the drafters
phrased this section so that men as well as women are now covered. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch.
38, § 11-14, comment (1961). For similar recommendations made by the English investi-
gating committee, see WOLFENDEN REPORT 54-55.
76. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-14 (1961); PRop. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00
(1964); MPG § 251.2(1). The Illinois and Model codes specifically include deviate
sexual behavior within the definition of proscribed conduct; although the New York code
refers only to "any sexual act," the drafters of that section apparently believed that devi-
ate behavior would be covered. PRop. N.Y. PENAL LAW 384 (1964).
77. MPG § 251.2(5); ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-18 (1961). The early Illinois
case of Raymond v. People, 9 Ill. App. 344, 346 (1881) defines a "patron" of a brothel.
78. PRop. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.25 (1964); MPG § 230.2.
79. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-10 to -11 (1961).
80. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-10, comment (1961).
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forbid only sexual intercourse, not deviate conduct. The second, the con-
cern for the abuse of family authority,8 was also considered by the Illinois
drafters and led them to include deviate behavior within the proscription
of sections 11-10 ("Aggravated Incest") and 11-11 ("Incest"). 82 This
second consideration was also the basis for the distinction between the two
sections. The drafters, believing that "Aggravated Incest," sexual relations
between father and daughter, 3 posed the greatest threat to the normal
family relationship, proscribed a greater penalty for "Aggravated Incest"
than for "Incest," sexual relations between mother and son or brother and
sister.8 The behavior sought to be prohibited is heterosexual; 5 deviate
conduct between siblings of the same sex is not forbidden under the incest
sections." Unless such conduct is covered under the sections concerned
with the protection of individuals from force, of children from the advances
of more mature individuals or the effects of youthful sexual experimenta-
tion, or of society from annoyances, it is not proscribed.
B. Unequal Law Enforcement
By not proscribing private consensual behavior and by structuring the
new code around the four enumerated interests, the drafters have made pos-
81. The drafters of the Model Penal Code evaluated five considerations: (1) the im-
pact of religious tenets; (2) the science of genetics; (3) sociological and anthropo-
logical objectives, i.e., the promotion of the solidarity of the family unit, of the cohesive-
ness of the larger social group, and the cultural diffusion; (4) the general intense hostility
to this behavior; and (5) the protection of young and dependent females. MODEL PENAL
CODe § 207.3, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (now MPC § 230.2).
82. The tentative final draft of the new Illinois criminal code did not proscribe
deviate behavior between mother and son or brother and sister; the possibility of biologi-
cal risk was the only element considered. However, the section as enacted does pro-
scribe this type of behavior; there is no comment on the change in position of the drafters.
See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-11, comment (1961).
83. A "daughter" is defined as "a blood daughter regardless of legitmacy or age;
and . . .a stepdaughter or an adopted daughter under the age of 18." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 11-10 (1961). Sexual intercourse is absolutely proscribed between father and
blood daughter according to the first consideration, and deviate sexual activity
is penalized under the second. In the case of a step or adopted daughter, only the
second consideration is relevant, so the proscription is not absolute and applies only to a
daughter under the age of eighteen.
84. Section 11-10 provides for imprisonment of from one to twenty years in the state
penitentiary; § 11-11, of from one to ten years. A deviate sexual act between a fifteen
year old boy and a younger girl is a misdememeanor under § 11-5 ("Contributing to the
Delinquency of a Child") but if they are brother and sister, they are guilty of a felony
(§ 11-11).
85. See People v. Whitman, 406 Ill. 593, 94 N.E.2d 506 (1950).
86. The range of acts covered by the statute was discussed in People v. Knapp, 15
Ill. 2d 450, 155 N.E.2d 565 (1959). The relationship of the participants has been held
to be an essential element of the offense. People v. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d 257, 189 N.E.
2d 299 (1963); People v. Laughery, 396 Ill. 213, 71 N.E.2d 46 (1947).
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sible full enforcement of the new Illinois code. The situations in which
deviate behavior is now proscribed are those which will in some manner be
brought to the attention of the authorities and which will be considered suit-
able for full prosecution. 7 The victim of a forcible assault or the affronted
observer of an act of public indecency reasonably may be expected to protest
such behavior; a child or his parents, the victim, or a relative may complain
of conduct constituting an exploitation of youth or a violation of normal
family relationships. Thus the authorities will learn of most of these viola-
tions as they would not of private consensual adult acts. Although the
Model and New York codes do not classify sexual offenses according to the
interests, they, like the Illinois law, do not proscribe adult consensual be-
havior, and so the offenses described in their respective sections are suscepti-
ble of full enforcement.
C. Blackmail
As long as any given type of behavior is condemned by the existing social
mores, blackmail of persons engaging in that behavior will persist, whether
or not these persons are subject to criminal prosecution. s Therefore, the
exclusion of consensual acts from the enumerated situations in which devi-
ate sexual conduct is illegal may have no significant effect on the incidence
of blackmail. The removal of criminal sanctions will simply "withdraw the
state from partnership in blackmail." "
D. Guilt Feelings
The removal of the criminal sanction for consensual sodomitic behavior
may help eliminate guilt feelings caused by the involvement in illegal acts
of sexual gratification. But this elimination is limited by the persisting non-
legal taboos on the conduct. A man may well have guilt feelings at least as
strong concerning behavior condemned socially as that proscribed legally.
The strong religious sanction on any sexual behavior except normal hetero-
87. See WOLFENDEN REPORT 40, 58.
88. See DEPARTMENT OF CRMsINAL SCIENCE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY, SEXUAL Oi-
FENcES 430 (1957).
89. Note, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 83, 88 (1959). The Model Penal Code has made one
attempt to reduce spite complaints, which often closely resemble blackmail threats, by
requiring that all complaints of sexual offenses against children be promptly filed. The
proper authorities must be notified within three months of the occurrence of the act or,
in cases involving children under sixteen, within three months of the time a parent or
guardian learns of the matter. MPG § 213.6(5). An example of a prosecution that
would have been barred under such a provision is Honselman v. People, 168 Ill. 172, 48
N.E. 304 (1897), where the defendant, a fair grounds guard, had put the fourteen year
old complainant out of the fair grounds a few months before the complaint was filed. The
alleged deviate sexual offense had been committed one year before. An English committee
(WOLFENDEN REPORT 85) has suggested that all complaints of sexual offenses be filed
within twelve months.
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sexual relations is one strong inhibiting element; unfavorable peer group
consensus is another. Arguably, then, the incidence of such psychic dis-
turbances is unaffected by the enactment of this new approach to sexual
offenses. E. Uncontrollable Behavior
Under the view that deviate sexual conduct is uncontrollable, the Illinois,
Model and New York codes may be seen as proscribing this conduct in
situations in which it is only directed against others to their physical or
moral harm or shock and embarrassment. A pattern of behavior in private
deviate activity with other consenting, unrelated adults harms no one and
so the uncontrollability of the conduct is immaterial.
The view that persons engaged in deviate sexual conduct are ill or irre-
sponsible is not universally accepted. Considerable evidence exists that they
are no less able to control their sexual conduct," to respond to medical treat-
ment,91 or to refrain from recidivism92 than other criminal offenders. If this
behavior is not uncontrollable, the codes reflect community sentiment con-
cerning the direction of sexual intent against a physical victim, a child, the
public, or a close relative.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the new Illinois criminal code attempted to solve the
problems resulting from the existence and enforcement of an ambiguous
"crime against nature" provision by grouping the criminal sanctions around
four interests considered to be within the realm of legislative activity. Al-
though the total effectiveness of this approach is still undetermined, tenta-
tive conclusions may be drawn.
The specific definition of proscribed deviate behavior, section 11-2, and
the subsequent delineation of situations in which it is illegal eliminates the
problem of lack of notice to the defendant. Similarly, the pattern of un-
even enforcement will diminish because the careful statement of the interests
and drafting of the article limits the proscription to that conduct likely to
be noticed and punished. The other problems, however, have not been
solved. The incidence of blackmail and the existence or intensity of personal
guilt feelings are largely independent of statutory proscription and will not
be significantly affected by the removal of criminal sanctions. Uncontrolla-
ble behavior is completely independent of either statutory or social sanc-
tions, and so will not be at all affected by the new criminal code.
90. See WOLFENDEN REPORT 34.
91. Id. at 105.
92. Id. at 58-59; DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL SCIENCE, CAMBRunE UNIVERSITY, Op.
cit. supra note 88, at 435. Professor Paul W. Tappan has concluded that "[United
States] sex offenders are among the least recidivous of all types of criminals. They do not
characteristically repeat as do... burglars, aronists, and thieves." Id. at 513.
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